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Drug Matrix cell E2: Treatment systems; Generic and cross-cutting issues
S  Seminal  studies  K  Key studies  R  Reviews  G  Guidance  MORE  Search for more studies
S  Chronic care for chronic conditions  (2002). Impl ications  of truly treating addiction of the kind seen by many treatment services  as  analogous to a  chronic
disease include organis ing long-term monitoring and care (on which see this  review) and judging services  on how the patient fares  in treatment, not after they
leave. Also freely avai lable from this  source
K  £3 for £1 cla im offers  treatment investment rationale for commiss ioners  (1999). NTORS recruited i ts  national  Engl ish treatment sample in 1995 when al l  the
modal i ties  i t s tudied were under threat. It estimated that within one year they had reaped benefi ts  which greatly outweighed their costs , an estimate analysed by
Findings  in the featured report and in a  presentation. An NTORS analys is  (2004) for the two years  after treatment entry came up with an even steeper cost:savings
ratio. Later the DTORS study (2009) of another national  Engl ish drug treatment sample reached almost identical  one-year conclus ions, but on shakier grounds.
K  Chal lenge to Scottish treatment system (2006). Recruiting i ts  sample in 2001, DORIS was  the Scottish equivalent to the Engl ish NTORS. It chal lenged the Scottish
treatment system to forefront abstinence as  an aim because this  i s  what the patients  want (see analys is  in cel l  A2’s  bi te) and because i t leads  to pos itive outcomes
in terms of socia l  integration. Both may be true, but neither was  proved by DORIS. See also these reports  on employment (2008) and crime (2007) outcomes, and an
omnibus  report (2008) on the project’s  findings.
K  Successful  completion indicator of lasting remiss ion in England ([UK] National  Treatment Agency for Substance Misuse, 2010). Support for the contention bui l t
in to national  pol icy and funding cri teria  that leaving treatment after having ‘successful ly completed’ i s  an indicator of lasting remiss ion and that in these terms,
the treatment was  indeed more l ikely to have been successful  than i f patients  left under other ci rcumstances. However, the same analys is  (and another publ ished
in 2012) suggests  staying in treatment for at least a  few years  is  even better.
K  Systems change helped improve access  to and retention in treatment (2008). National  US programme (web s i te under Guidance) halved waiting times and
extended retention partly by fostering a  sel f-sustaining inter-service improvement network and a performance analys is  system l inked to funding. See also this  later
extens ion (2012) to the programme.
K  Expert coaching helps  services  improve patient access  and retention (2013). Randomised tria l  tested the improvement col laborative model  developed by the US
NIATx qual i ty improvement resource. Arrangements  for services  to learn from each other were less  effective and less  cost effective at improving patient access  and
retention than ass igning each cl inic an NIATx-trained qual i ty improvement expert to individual ly ‘coach’ them through the process .
K  Pay for results  not for trying (2008). US state of Delaware incentivised patient recruitment and engagement outcomes rather than methods; the result was  more
patients  and more engaging treatment.
K  Recovery support vouchers  (2009). In Washington state in the USA patients  given vouchers  to purchase recovery services  stayed in treatment longer and were
more l ikely to gain employment.
K  How much should treatment systems rely on res identia l  rehabi l i tation? (2007). Confirmed that unless  there are press ing contraindications, intens ive day
options  del iver outcomes equivalent to res identia l  care. Often of course, there are press ing contraindications. See also this  informal  Findings  review.
R  Continuing long-term care helps  sustain treatment gains  (2009). The impl ication for this  US expert reviewer is  that dependence is  best treated as  a  chronic
condition. A later review (2014) bui l t on his  work, adding 13 studies  and aggregating a l l  substance use outcomes reported in the tria ls . Result was  sti l l  pos i tive,
but less  so than the previous  review’s  count of studies  which found at least one measure enhanced by continuing care. See also associated guidance.
R  Recovery-oriented systems of care (2008). Creating a  recovery-friendly environment is  the best way to sustain resolution of substance use problems argues  this
(as  we described i t) “sweeping, learned but practice-oriented tour-de-force”.
R  Research supporting components  of a  recovery system ([US] Substance Abuse and Mental  Health Services  Administration, 2009). Evidence for key elements  of
recovery-oriented systems of care such as  continuity of care anchored in the community and del ivered by integrated services  on the bas is  of system-wide
education and training. See also associated implementation case studies .
R  Pol icy strategies  for improving outcomes (2011). Two of the world’s  most respected addiction researchers  a lso with top-level  pol icymaking experience set out
the options  for improving treatment systems.
R  Research yet to show payment-by-results  improves  outcomes (Report for the Austral ian Department of Health, 2014). Across  health care and in respect of drug
and alcohol  services , “there is  l i ttle evidence that [pay-for-performance] i s  effective in improving cl ient outcomes”. That verdict took in the disappointing ini tia l
findings  on UK payment-by-results  schemes for problem drinkers  and drugtakers .
G  Commiss ioning for recovery ([UK] National  Treatment Agency for Substance Misuse, 2010).
G  Integrated care for drug or a lcohol  users  (Report Produced for the Scottish Advisory Committee on Drug Misuse, 2008). Guidance for Scotland on implementing a
treatment system which aims to combine and coordinate a l l  the services  required to meet the assessed needs of the patient.
G  Strategies  to promote continuing care (2009). Expert US consensus  on practical  s trategies  to promote continuing care based on review above.
G  US NIATx system change tools  ([US] NIATx, accessed 2014). Web-based service based at Univers i ty of Wisconsin and supported by US government offers
practical  s trategies  for commiss ioners  and planners  to promote change across  a  treatment system including establ ishing engaging services  in mutual  leaning and
support, tested in this  study. Speci fic a ims include reducing waiting times and improving retention (see this  example), and increas ing admiss ions  and reducing no-
shows (see this  example).
G  Planning and implementing treatment and rehabi l i tation (United Nations, 2003). Strategic framework, integrating services , and evaluation.
MORE  This  search retrieves  a l l  relevant analyses .
For subtopics  go to the subject search page and hot topics  on evidence-based commiss ioning and recovery as  a  treatment objective. See also this  on-l ine l ibrary of
papers  related to recovery-oriented systems of care.
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What is this cell about? How across an administrative area to engineer an effective and cost-effective mix of services which offers
patients/clients appropriate options for entering and moving between services or using them in parallel. Involves commissioning,
contracting and purchasing decisions to meet local needs in the context of resource constraints and national policy. Activities include:
needs assessment; restructuring or re-tendering services; contractual requirements on services to demonstrate evidence-based practice,
meet standards, and implement performance monitoring; and financial or other rewards/sanctions linked to activity, quality or outcomes.
Research on whole treatment systems is rarely of the ‘gold standard’ randomised controlled trial format (there is just one example in this
cell). Instead researchers often have to interpret how things happen in the messy real world, attempting to isolate what may have been
the active ingredients among a complex set of variables not under their control. The key limitation of such methodologies is the difficulty
of being sure what (if anything) was cause and what effect.
Where should I start? William White’s monograph could form not just the start, but middle and end of an investigation of the recovery
transformation in treatment. It comes from (see his collected writings) someone who more than any other has promoted and provided the
scholarly underpinnings to the recovery movement – ‘movement’ in two senses of the word: a campaign enthused by what its adherents
see as revolutionary ideas and ideals; and a shift in treatment from isolated bouts of professional care forced by a problem which has
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become intolerably severe or attracted attention, to on the one hand, intervening before things have descended to this point, and on the
other, locating treatment as often merely the first step (as advocated by a US expert) to extended “recovery maintenance”. In this vision,
the focus shifts to systems around the clinic within which the patient must eventually reshape their life in community with others who
have done or are trying to do the same, secured by ties to family, community, and work. Explore this monograph to appreciate what this
means for commissioners, services and treatment staff.
Optimistic and enthusing though it is, interpretations of ‘recovery’ have their (to some) less appealing side, including the implication that
only patients who have left treatment can be recovered, an associated push to limit treatment durations (one of the roots of the current
recovery phase in the UK) rather than letting patient and clinician decide, and a tendency to relegate harm reduction to secondary
importance. There are also competing paradigms, including the contention that “Harm Reduction is the goal – not a step along the ‘road
to recovery’ or the path to ‘freedom from dependence’.”
Highlighted study Our highlighted study tested the key methodology of the US NIATx partnership (featured in cell D2’s bite) for
generating improved patient access and retention across a treatment network – the learning collaborative model. In the process it
revealed the great strength of randomised trials; they can generate truly surprising results which by eliminating extraneous influences
also eliminate alternative explanations, leaving no ‘excuses’. The result can be to force the researcher to re-evaluate the expectations
which led to the study. Lead researcher in this case was NIATx director Dave Gustafson, whose organisation promotes the model he
tested.
Check the free source for the study and you will see that the model’s cheapest method – monthly, expert-led teleconferences between
staff from different clinics – made no significant difference to any of the processes it was intended to improve. The other way services
could learn from each other, face-to-face versions of the teleconferences, were associated with improvements in waiting time for
treatment, but not in retention or patient numbers. Given the weak performance of these methods, it comes as no surprise that combining
them with coaching did not improve on just having an expert quality improvement coach to support and guide clinic staff. In other words,
the collaborative bit of the learning collaborative model rarely generated improvements, and created no added value over and above the
non-collaborative approach of assigning each clinic an expert guide. Coaching was also much cheaper than both face-to-face conferences
and the combined intervention.
The message for commissioners seems inescapable: if you are responsible for treatment provision across an area, employ a quality
improvement expert and set them to work with each service; don’t waste money getting services to talk to each other. That’s the way to
at least give more patients a greater chance of getting better (as Keith Humphreys pointed out, whether the process gains actually
improved outcomes is unknown). Is this how you see it? Apart from the usual caveats, notice that the ‘collaboratives’ were not natural
networks, like services with the same catchment area, doing the same kind of work, or seeing the same kinds of patients. Within each US
state, each clinic was randomly allocated to the different improvement methods. And there you have the great weakness of this kind of
randomised trial: by eliminating extraneous influences, it risks eliminating some which are not extraneous at all, but essential to the
intervention working – perhaps in this case, a common interest across collaborating clinics.
Issues to think about
 Were crime cuts ever the justification they seemed for treatment? In the ’90s post-treatment cuts in crime resulting in an estimate that
society saved £3 for every £1 spent on treatment helped rescue UK drug services from an attack by the then Conservative government
(for which see cell A2’s bite), and became the Labour government’s main rationale for expanding provision. Since 2010 crime has been
subsumed under the broader recovery agenda, but the economic bottom line remains the same: in terms of hard-nosed return on
investment, the justification is still cuts in crime linked to the reduced need for overwhelmingly poor and unemployed patients to raise
money for illegal drugs.
Crime reductions after treatment entry are real enough, but did society really save as
a result? The ‘£3 for £1’ estimate came from the NTORS study of patients newly
attending drug treatment services in England in 1995. From that data it was
calculated that £5.2 million crime-related savings resulted from an extra £1.6 million
spent on treatment – roughly the 3:1 ratio  figure. Look at the Findings analysis and
the presentation in the relevant Key Study entry. They show that:
• Unusually, the £1.6 million was not the full cost of treatment during the follow-up
year, but how much this exceeded the £1.4 million spent the year before; add in the
full costs and arguably assume previous treatment helped too, and costs could rise
to £4.4 million – close to the calculated savings.
• A large proportion – probably nearly half – of those savings related to stolen or
defrauded property and money, from which the calculations unrealistically assumed
no one benefited. Eliminate these (as some economists would) from the calculations
and savings might drop to £2.9 million.
Already these alternative assumptions result in treatment costing more than it saved,
implying that in these terms, it was a bad deal for society. But there was more.
Plausibly (as NTORS itself suggested), criminal activity peaked before treatment
entry and then progressively fell. If this was the case, the study’s methodology would
have inflated the before-to-after crime reduction and in turn the cost-savings
estimate.
In any event, NTORS’ caseload suggests crime reduction justifies treatment only for
the 1 in 10 patients highly criminally active before treatment, among whom
reductions in acquisitive crime were concentrated. Whatever the true figures,
criminal justice savings may not be an incentive to health services which bear the
costs not only of addiction treatment, but sometimes also of responding to the
medical needs revealed when patients enter treatment.
But a failure (if that’s what it was) to demonstrate net benefits is not the same as
there being none. Benefits there almost certainly were in terms of saved and
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improved lives. These were not included in NTORS’ economic estimates, leaving
crime as the main component.
This crucial episode in the survival and expansion of treatment provision in the UK raises some fundamental issues. Most of all, how
precarious it is to justify treatment as saving money, rather than seeing it as money well spent to save lives and alleviate distress and
illness. Ask yourself, does anyone question cancer treatments on the grounds that they fail to save more money than they cost? Instead
the traditional yardstick is how much the treatment costs per year of good quality life it gains. Unfortunately, drug addiction treatment
also appears to perform poorly on this perhaps incomplete yardstick; addiction to illegal drugs spreads diminished quality of life well
beyond the patient. Then there is whether the researchers should have presented alternative cost:savings scenarios, even if they showed
costs exceeding savings. And if they had, given the scepticism over treatment which generated the study, whether that would have meant
a standstill or shrinking treatment system incapable of helping all but a small proportion of those in need.
 Is payment by results the way out? Out that is, of the apparent bind described in cell D2 – that treatment organisations doing least well
for patients are probably also the ones least likely to open themselves to influence and scrutiny. Setting process targets/incentives for
them may force them to improve that process (such as for example retention), but this may bear little relation to improved patient
welfare and reductions in problem substance use. The obvious solution is to directly incentivise those outcomes, leaving services to work
out for themselves how to get there.
In the form of payment-by-results schemes, the UK government thinks this is the way forward, and broadly so do two of the world’s most
respected addiction experts both with top-level policy experience – Keith Humphreys, for years a keen observer of British policy, and
Thomas McLellan, now advising Public Health England and formerly deputy head of the US government’s drug strategy office. Their hunch
(the research barely supported more) was that bringing quasi-market forces to bear on treatment systems is the most promising strategy
– in particular, rewarding milestones such as abstinence or major use reduction during or at the end of treatment. Such tactics are the
distinctive feature of UK payment-by-results schemes. Does this mean they are on the right track?
This discussion of the schemes points out they have to be consistent, concrete and prescriptive about what they expect from treatment
services, seemingly at odds with the individualisation stressed by recovery advocates. In theory local schemes could create a space for
the patient’s ambitions in their payment criteria, but this is not a required element or one included in the national criteria, nor one which
sits easily within a system predicated on observable outcomes the public and their representatives recognise and are willing to pay for.
Instead schemes pre-set what counts as success without reference to what the individual patient wants, and in a way services cannot
afford to ignore.
Then take a look at McLellan’s study of one such scheme implemented across the US state of Delaware. Results exemplified their
strengths and limitations. The pattern and pace of improvements suggest services did respond to financial incentives, focusing their
greatest efforts where rewards too were greatest, but also that they did just enough to harvest the rewards, without seeking to do more
to further help their patients. It seems to reinforce concerns that (like contingency management incentives for the patients) such systems
engender a mentality of doing just enough to get the money, but no more.
Even if outcomes could be directly and accurately measured – a task which has expensively occupied teams of researchers – just what
led to them would remain unclear, particularly since patients commonly traverse several treatment services and modalities before
sustainably overcoming dependence. Giving all the credit to the last episode ignores the contribution of any predecessors which paved
the way for ‘its’ successes.
To these in-principle issues can be added the particular criteria prioritised by English schemes. Practicalities if nothing else mean they
often specify in-treatment and treatment exit measures rather than post-treatment recovery indicators, and the post-treatment indicators
are confined to routinely collected criminal justice and treatment records which bear a loose relationship to treatment success. Though
introduced in the name of recovery, the national framework for the schemes places a premium on drug-free discharges of patients who
then are not seen in treatment and other records for at least a year – on the face of it, at odds with the continuing contact presupposed
by the recovery vision and by McLellan’s understanding of the nature of treated addiction.
Evidentially, payment-by-results in health care of any kind is a leap in the dark. A review of reviews could find no evaluations which
reported on patient outcomes and a review specific to drug and alcohol treatment could find “little evidence that [pay-for-performance] is
effective in improving client outcomes”. That is presumably one reason why the English schemes are pilots. Take a look at their initial
results and focus on the 6582 patients being treated for drug rather than alcohol problems. Note that consistent gains were seen only in
the proportion who while in treatment said (via forms completed by staff) they had stopped using their problem substance(s). Against the
same comparators, the proportion exiting treatment free of dependence – a measure closer to the government’s recovery ambitions –
was worse in the pilots. Other measures were seemingly unaffected. “Mixed” was the document’s characterisation of the results;
‘disappointing’ might also be justified – but these are early days.
You will have your own questions about payment-by-results and their English implementation, so critical to the future of treatment in the
UK. Here are some starters. Surely a charity or health service should not need external incentives to strive to do the best for its patients?
Yet without these, would services stay unstretched within acceptable-quality comfort zones? Are pre-set objectives desirable, pushing
services to deliver on national and local priorities, improving comparability across services, and preventing them glossing over their
shortcomings? Or do they stifle patient-centred practice, preventing treatment objectives being based on the patient’s priorities? Maybe
all the above? Does the no-return-for-a-year criterion incentivise services to make sure their patients’ recovery lasts, or tempt them to
counterproductively place hurdles in the way of treatment re-entry? Where does it leave long-term continuing care of the kind advocated
by some authorities on recovery? Other issues are raised in this blog from a keen observer of the process, of which perhaps the most
worrying is the diversion of resources to administration and to the added step needed to assess the ‘tariff’ for each patient, which in turn
means their “first contact is not with a helping service but a payment system.” Assess these concerns against the backdrop of an existing
treatment system which has itself been widely criticised for failing to deliver recovery outcomes. Is that criticism justified, could the pilot
mechanisms do any worse?
Thanks for their comments on this entry in draft to Professors A. Thomas McLellan, Keith Humphreys and Michael Gossop. Commentators bear no responsibility for the
text including the interpretations and any remaining errors.
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